Market response to economic policies: a stumbling block for policymakers by Kurt Dew
Kurt Dew*
Two new themes-(1) optimal control and
(2) rational expectations - have arisen re-
cently in the economic-policy literature, ~nd
each of them promises to have a dramatic im-
pact upon future analyses of appropriate pol-
icy-making. First, the literature on optimal
control deals basically with the use of imperfect
econometric models in forming policy deci-
sions. The literature emphasizes the develop-
ment of efficient rules for responding to the
errors that would otherwise lead policymakers
away from their economic goals. Optimal-con-
trol research seems to suggest that with a rea-
sonably careful utilization of an econometric
model and the use of mathematically derived
rules for policy adjustment, the policymaker
can improve upon alternative policies such as
the constant money-growth rule proposed by
Nobel laureate Milton Friedman. Some re-
search even suggests that the adjustment proc-
ess derived from optimal-control techniques is
so efficient that the policymaker who uses the
wrong model (i.e., one that doesn't describe
the economy's behavior as well as other avail-
able models) may still improve upon Fried-
manesque inactive policy by responding quickly
to his mistakes.
1 Optimal-control results thus
seem to provide arguments for activist eco-
nomic policies.
In contrast, the rational-expectations litera-
ture tends to discredit activist policies because
of a different interpretation of one of the fund-
amental issues in policy-making-the nature of
the public response to economic-policy deci-
sions. Since the time of Keynes, economists
have made the reasonable assumption that eco-
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nomic agents - households and firms - cope
with an uncertain future by making forecasts,
and that these forecasts play a key role in de-
termining eventual future levels of economic
activity. Yet the rational-expectations litera-
ture suggests that households and firms do not
form their expectations of future events the way
that most economists presume they do. Fur-
thermore, if economic agents form expectations
in a way that is "rational" (i.e. using all the
available information rather than just part of
it), the latitude of policy-makers to exert a
beneficial impact upon economic welfare is re-
duced or even eliminated. Policy-makers in
such a world may not improve the expected
future levels of economic activity, but they
may, by informing consumers ahead-of-time
about future policy, reduce consumer uncer-
tainty about future variations in economic ac-
tivity. Therefore, rules such as Friedman's con-
stant money-growth rule, having the twin ad-
vantages of simplicity and clarity, are good
policy prescriptions. The rational-expectations
assumption thus tends to nullify the implica-
tions of optimal-control analysis and leads to
the conclusion that passive policies are the
most appropriate ones.
Consequently, a policy-maker's choice be-
tween active policies of "leaning against" the
economic winds or passive policies such as
Friedman's constant money-growth rule comes
down to this: Can the policy responses that are
generated by optimal-control rules overcome
the uncertainties regarding future economic be-
havior that are created by rational expecta-
tions? To provide some insight into this issue,
we describe two alternative methods used by
economists to analyze the formulation of house-hold expectations. By considering the particu-
lar example of the consumption decision, we
show how the outcome of a particular policy
can be adversely affected through a misinter-
pretation of the means by which the consumer
forms his expectations.
When the policy-maker writes his decisions
in stone, a mistaken notion of the method of
formulating consumer expectations can be dis-
astrous. But the more interesting case is one
where the policy-maker is more flexible, using
the method of optimal control to adjust his
policies to his initial errors. In this instance,
we show that the policy-maker can improve his
policy results by using optimal-control tech-
niques, but that his misjudgment of the means
by which consumers forecast future income
nonetheless adds instability to the economy.
Formation of Expectations: Adaptive
The current standard approach to the model-
ing of expectation formulation assumes that
economic agents form expectations adaptively.
The adaptive expectations hypothesis is devel-
oped by induction. In the case of consumer
forecasting of future income, for example, the
consumer is presumed to begin with a forecast
of levels of personal disposable income (PDI)
in each future period. The consumer knows
that he will commit forecasting errors, and he
believes that these errors are related, in the
sense that a low forecast in one year indicates
that all his predictions may be .too low. He
reflects this knowledge by revising his future
estimates upward when his current forecast is
too low. We might suppose that a $10-billion
under-estimation of PDI this quarter will cause
the consumer to revise his next year's forecast
upward by 20 percent of the $lO-billion error.
If so, this year's forecast will differ from last
year's attempt by $2 billion, 20 percent of $10
billion.
But by the same token, last year's.estimate
was the result of a revision of the forecast of
two years ago, which was increased or lowered
depending upon whether it had been an under-
estimate or an over-estimate. So we may think
of this year's expectation of 1977 PDI as a
forecast made in 1974 that has been subse-
quently revised in light of the errors in 1975
and 1976 income-or proceeding backward,
may even think of it as a forecast originally
made (say) in 1970 and adjusted for the errors
made in PDI in each subsequent year. We
might thus expect that the original estimate
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itself would become less and less important,
and that the actual levels of PDI in periods
after the original estimate would become more
and more important. If so, we could safely
state that the forecast of PDI for 1977 (or
1978, or any subsequent year) depends upon
actual past levels of PDI. We might write this
hypothesis in the form of an equation
Where the symbol
E197G(PDI1977) represents the estimate (E)
in 1976, ofpersonal disposable income (PDI)
in 1977,
and k1, k2, k", ... the weights used to project
past levels of PDI into 1977.
We might further suppose that the estimate is a
weighted average of the past values of PDI, so
that k1 + k2 + ka + ... = 1.
The hypothesis that expectations of future
values of an economic variable are weighted
averages of past values of this variable is
known as the hypothesis of adaptive expecta-
tions. Macroeconomists utilize adaptive expec-
tations to help explain the sluggishness of the
economy's response to external shocks. If the
adaptive expectations hypothesis is correct,
consumption (for example) would be set by
the consumer at a level proportional to his
estimate of the value of his own future income.
But because the consumer forms his expecta-tions adaptively, he is sluggish in revising his
estimates and therefore sluggish in revising his
consumption. Last year's PDI might lead him
to expect an increase in his future PDI, but the
lower PDI of earlier years also would have an
effect on his forecast. Thus, he raises his esti-
mate of expected future income more slowly
than the rate of increase in present earnings.
Formation of Expectations: Rational
(2) PV = G1976 + l~P G1977 + n4;-2 G 1978 + ...
where PDI1ll7,,, PDI,D,7' ••• are the added dis-
posable income in future years resulting from
the intended government expenditure program.
Where G jD,,;> G'D77 ••• are the intended lev-
els of government expenditure in the future,
and p is the consumer's internal rate of discount
of future disposable income, added to reflect
the fact that a dollar received now is of greater
value to the consumer than the same amount
received later.
Or if the consumer were more sophisticated,
he might analyze the full impact of government
spending by estimating the value of the added
disposable income accruing from the intended
government expenditure.
Some economists have challenged the adap-
tive-expectations assumption because the con-
sumer under this approach tends to ignore
some important information about the future
path of key economic variables. The consumer
may well have some notions of the intentions
of public policy-makers, which it would be
"rational" for him to include in his forecast of
the growth of future disposable income.2
How would a consumer forecast the effect of
government expenditures upon PDI? He might
estimate the present value (PV) to him of the
stream of future government expenditures:
C1977
= aA
POI 1978 POI 1979 A = k(POI 1977 +-1-- +"--+
+P (1+p)2
(5) a)
Here "k" is a constant chosen so that the sum
of the weights of each of the yearly forecasts of
PDI is one, and A is a weighted average of the
PDI's. For example, the weight of PDI,D7, is k;
the weight of PDI,D78 is k/l+p; for PDI'D7!l'
1</(1+pF and k + 1</1 +p + 1'/(1+p)2 + .
= 1. Since in this case PDI,D77 = PDI1D78 = .
= $10,000 and the weights on the PDI's sum
to one, A = $10,000. The consumer is inter-
ested in the behavior of income over his life-
time because he prefers to minimize the year~
to-year variation in his rate of consumption.
The consumer's income may fluctuate as time
goes on, but he attempts to mitigate the effects
of his fluctuating income upon the level of con-
sumption, and pays attention primarily to the
average level of income he expects to receive
over the long haul.
Aggregating consumption over the popula-
tion of consumers, we may characterize the
life-cycle hypothesis in two equations
current value the consumer places upon the
income he expects to earn throughout his life-
time. Suppose, for example, the consumer were
certain that he would earn $10,000 in personal
disposable income for each coming year in per-
petuity. To determine his life cycle income, he
uses the relationship
(4)
PDI 1977 + ~2 PDI 1978 + ... (3) PV PDI 1976
+
The Consumption Function
According to the widely accepted life-cycle
hypothesis, consumption expenditures during
any particular period of time depend upon the
(5 b) A=ntPT [
POI1978 POI 1979 POI +--+--+
1977 1+p (1+p)2 ...J
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Income Generated under Adaptive




Consumption Function with Adaptive
Expectations
When we cease to assume that the con-
sumer's life-cycle income, A, is known before-
hand, we must replace it with an estimate, de-
noted by E(A). If expectations of future PDI
are adaptive, expectations take on a form
where CI077 = consumption in 1977
a = proportion of life-cycle income
consumed in each period.
These equations describe how consumption is
related to expected life-cycle income when A,
the value of life-cycle income, is known to the
consumer.
Quarters after beginning of program
(6) E
1976
CA) ~ ko PDI 1976 + k1 PDI1975 + ...
In other words, the current (1976) estimate of
life-cycle income depends upon past disposable
income. To illustrate the effect of adaptive ex-
pectations upon the consumption decision, we
use a variant of the expression for the consump-
tion function used by Modigliani.3
Since we assume that consumers form esti-
mates of future income on the basis of knowl-
edge of the past levels of income, we may con-
clude that they respond to a change in public
policy as they would to any other economic
shock, revising their expectations of future in-
come only slowly as income increases. As a
result of this sluggish response, a change in gov-
ernment expenditure increases the level of con-
sumer expenditures quite slowly. To demon-
state this point, we use the consumption function
from Modigliani to display the effect of adaptive
expectations upon a critical variable,
the income multiplier of an increase in govern-
ment expenditures at any pointin time.
Consider the case of a $1O-billion increase in
real government expenditures sustained over a
three-year horizon. We assume at first that the
policy-maker believes that consumers form ex-
pectations adaptively, and then contrast the ex-
pected policy outcome with the actual outcome
when expectations are rational. Although the
new government expenditures increase income
from the very outset at a rate in excess of $10
billion per year, the consumer initially has only
a single quarter of higher income to offset his
past experience of income at a lower level. He
is thus slow to revise his estimate of life-cycle
income upward, so that consumption at first
rises by only a relatively small amount. How-
ever, as time goes on and the Government con-
tinues to spend at the higher rate, the consumer
becomes increasingly convinced of the per-
manence of the additions to income. This in-
creasing certainty leads to higher levels of con-
sumption and therefore to steadily increasing
levels of income, over and above the $10 billion
per year in added income produced directly by
the government expenditures.
4 If in general we
define .6PDIt as the difference between PDI
with and without the added government expen-
ditures in period t, then the government-spend-
ing multiplier becomes . Chart 1 in-
dicates the path that income takes when the
estimation of permanent income is based upon
adaptive expectations.
The increase in the multiplier through


























Multiplier Effects Under Adaptive Expectations
Increase in life-cycle POI
Total Due to G
Thus, consumers' forecasts of the future govern-
ment-spending contribution rise throughout the
period, until at the end of three years the con-
sumer expects to receive $10 billion per year in
perpetuity.
There is a disturbing aspect to this adaptive-
expectations approach. At the end of the three-
year period, when it is public knowledge that
the $1 O-billion government-expenditure pro-
gram will be curtailed, the adaptively forecast-
ing consumer is expecting the government to
continue spending the $10 billion in perpetuity.
Ittakes three more years without the $10 billion
to disabuse him of this notion.
oflife-cycle income, which in turn results from
expectations of future increases in government
expenditures and higher estimates of consump-
tiondue to multipliereffects. In Table (II), the
second column represents the consumer esti-
I11ate of aqditional life-cycle income resulting
from the three-year government expenditure
program and its multiplier effects upon con-
sumption. Similarly, the third column shows the
portion of the higher life-cycle income due di-
rectly to government expenditures, i.e., without




























How would the consumer value the same
3-year, $lO-billion per year program of in-
creased government expenditures if, contrary to
the policy-maker's belief, he were to perform
according to a rational rather than adaptive
scheme of expectations? This question can be
answered by reference to equation (5b). As
this equation suggests, the rational consumer is
concerned about future income, not past in-
come, so that past policies only matter to him if
they affect future income. He will thus react to
the government-expenditure program by evalu-
ating its future effects. As the three-year period
approaches its end, the program will have very
little further impact on his consumption deci-
sion, because it will only affect his income for a
few remaining quarters.
The policy's impact on life-cycle income in-
stead will be maximized at the outset, because
government expenditures are expected to con-
tinue for twelve quarters into the future. Con-
sequently, consumption out of life-cycle income
-and the income multiplier-also will be
greatest in the beginning of the program.
Chart I displays the difference between the
income generated by a government program
based on adaptive expectations and the income
generated based upon rational expectations. In
the latter case, the fiscal stimulus is greater at
the beginning of the period and thereafter de-
clines-just the opposite of what would be ex-
Table II
Multiplier Effects With Rational Expecta~ions
Increase in life-cycle POI













pected by a policy-maker using an adaptive-ex-
pectations forecast, who would be increasingly
disappointed throughout the three-year period.
Since the rational consumer expects future
consumption to be increased as a result of the
higher government expenditures, the value to
him of the government-spending program ex-
ceeds the value of the expenditures themselves,
including the value of the added consumption
induced by those expenditures. In either case,
the value of the income multiplier of the spend-
ing program declines as time goes on, whereas
the multiplier associated with an adaptive-ex-
pectations approach increases as time goes on.
Policy-maker's Mistaken Assumption of
Adaptive Expectations
As Chart 1 shows, the policy-maker who mis-
takenly assumes thatthe consumer forms expec-
tations adaptively would find his policy multi-
pliers becoming increasingly incorrect over the
three-year period. This is not an unusual turn
of events for the macroeconomist. Indeed, sub-
stantial empirical evidence suggests that policy
multipliers are subject to massive uncertainty.
Carl Christ has pointed out thatestimated values
of policy multipliers differ widely among the
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major econometric models, and has suggested
that this divergence of opinion seriously dam-
ages economists' ability to give policy advice. c,
The lack of certainty about the effect of pub-
lic policies would clearly be of serious concern
if the policy-maker were required to write his
decisions in stone. Arguing against the Christ
conclusion, Gregory Chow has shown that a
more flexible policy, which is revised when
short-run errors occur, can under some circum-stances be quite effective in offsetting multiplier
errors. (; Chow analyzes the policy-maker's be-
havior and his impact upon the economy when
he receives conflicting signals from two major
econometric models and erroneously follows the
incorrect one. To evaluate his argument and
obtain a realistic picture of the impact of public-
expenditure decisions when based upon a mis-
taken understanding of consumer expectations,
we must allow the policy-maker the latitude to
adjust his decisions.
We will imagine a world in which the policy-
maker believes that the consumer is an adaptive
forecaster, but the consumer is actually "ra-
tional" in the sense that he bases his forecasts
of disposable income upon his knowledge of the
announced path of government policy. When
the policy-maker discovers that he has made a
forecasting error, he will adapt his policy to this
mistake, revising his planned expenditures and
announcing his revised intentions to consum-
ers~'.Such a policy-maker would begin by look-
ing at his income goal for the first quarter. In
the present example, suppose that the policy-
maker wishes to raise the level of GNP by $10
billion above the level it would otherwise attain
in each of the next four years,8 and then reduce
government expenditures to their old levels. At
the beginning of the four-year program, the
poiicy-maker might well announce-utilizing
his adaptive expectations assumption-the de-
sirable levels of increased government expendi-
tures throughout the entire period.
We will assume that policy is revised once
each year over the four-year period. We will
also assume that the policy-maker does not
"forgive" himself for policy mistakes, i.e., he
intends to add the same $40 billion to the level
of GNP throughout the period as a whole re-
gardless of his year-to-year performance." We
can then determine the outcome at the end of
each year, and, show how the policy-maker
Chart 2
Intended and Actual Expenditures
Intended Actual





























26would revise his subsequent policy whenever he
errs in hitting his GNP target.
Chart 2 pictures each of the strategies that
the policy-maker constructs in this case. After a
false start in the first year, he realizes that his
policy did not incorporate sufficient stimulus in
the last half of the four-year period. This turn
of events results inevitably from his belief that
the stimulus provided by past policies is the
dominant concern of the consumer, when in fact
the consumer is quite rationally concerned with
the future stimulus the policy-maker intends to
provide.
The policy-maker then makes three revi-
sions in his forecast:
Chart 3
Actual and Intended Changes
in Disposable Income






1.) Reduces the planned additions to in-
come in the remainder of the period by the
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Table III
icy-maker from making the necessary adjust-
ments to target income more closely is the tem-
porary nature of government policy. Even
though the policy-maker boosts expenditure
levels by hefty amounts, the temporary nature
of the program tends to offset these increases as
the end of the program moves closer in time.
If the policy-maker intended a permanent in-
crease in annual income, the optimal-control
























Ratio of income to
expenditures-35.42/27,85
2.) Revises upward the consumption mul-
tiplier. The policy-maker mistakenly assumes
that part of the added income was due to a
shift in consumer's preference to a higher rate
of consumption out of life-cycle income.
3.) Increases the estimate of life-cycle in-
come. The policy-maker correctly detects
that the consumer's estimate of life-cycle in-
come was higher in the current period than
he had expected, but he incorrectly concludes
that the estimate of the next period's life-
cycle income will also be higher. These revi-
sions in the policy-maker's forecast result in
a change in the planned policy over the fol-
lowing three years.
The policy-maker then revises his 'intended
expenditures downward in an attempt to bring
his projection of more rapid income growth
back to desired levels.
Chart 3 pictures the effect of the four-year
policy upon income, and contrasts this with the
policy-maker's intended levels of income. In
the end, the increased government expenditures
produce $4.58 billion less PDI than intended, as
Table III demonstrates.
The fundamental factor preventing the pol-
27Conclusion
While consumer behavior is an important
concern of the policy-maker, policy decisions
are an equally important concern of the con-
sumer. Since policy is announced ahead of time
while other events affecting economic growth
are not, it is reasonable to suppose that house-
holds and firms will be affected by policy deci-
sions in a qualitatively different way than they
are by other economic shocks.
This possibility serves to emphasize the im-
portance of the distinction between the response
of an economy to an unforeseen turn of events
and the same economy's response to a predict-
able change in policy. While the existence of
prolonged changes in economic growth is indis-
putable, the policy-maker's abilityto offset these
divergences in the short run is still open to ques-
tion.
What we have shown is that announcing eco-
nomic policies ahead of time may create serious
difficulties for the policy-maker. This announce-
ment can.affect consumer expectations in ways
that are difficult to forecast. But the govern-
mentcan take two measures that would reduce
the extent,of this problem.
(1). If the policy-maker did not announce
his policies ahead of time, the consumer would
have no information about future policies and
would therefore form his expectations adap-
tively.
(2). If government-spending programs
brought about permanent, rather than tempo-
rary, increases in future disposable income, the
government-expenditure multiplier under ra-
tional expectations would not decline so rapidly
through time, and control of income would be-
come easier.
However, these options are, to our good for-
tune, not available to elected policy-makers.
The benefits of a government elected by the
people are, like most benefits, not without eco-
nomic costs.
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+ (1+p)2 ) (10 + ~ l+p
and adds this to income generated in the current
year. By this method. the consumer considers him-
self wealthier in the first year than he did in the
earlier example, primarily because he is unaware
of the low level of intended government expendi-
tures in years 2 through 4. The result is a rela-
tively high level of consumption, $12.58 billion.
somewhat above the $I0.58 billion in added in-
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Derivation of government expenditures and their
impact on DPI
In an adaptation of the Modigliani model, the method for forming his expectations, however. In-
policy-maker's model of income generation in the stead of using announced government expenditures
period i quarters ahead of the present period, -r , to estimate future income, the consumer simply
under his four-year policy of generating $10 billion makes his own valuation of an added $10 billion
per year of added PDI, can be expressed as per year in PDI for the second through the fourth
o i years:
LlCi
=.663[L b.LlPDI.+10 L b.] + (.74l i -
Te_
1 j=O J J j=T+1 J
The consumer's model of income generation i years
in the future is
lie.
1
To spend Planned in year
in year 1 2 3 4
1 7.63
2 4.91 .97
3 3.58 3.45 9.67
4 3.37 3.55 3.79 5.10
The table below shows the income resulting
from the policy-maker's two alternative approaches
to providing information to the consumer. The
results are quite similar, but by revealing income
intentions rather than expenditure intentions the
policy-maker gains a marginal increase in the four-
year ratio of income generated to expenditures-
1.48 with the income policy and 1.27 with the ex-
penditure policy. At the same time. he loses some
control over income generated-$5.48 billion away
from the $40-biIlion target with income policy, and
$4.58 billion away from target with the expendi-
tures policy.





















The consumer treats this problem as a dynamic
programmingproblemwith E j given.
These two sets of relationships highlight the dif-
ference between consumer and policy-maker. The
consumer is choosing present consumption based
upon his estimate of future income, but the policy-
maker is forecasting consumption from informa-
tion contained in past levels of personal consump-
tion.
Suppose that instead of announcing his planned
expenditures the policy-maker announced planned
levels of income. While this may seem more devi-
ous than announcing planned expenditures, in the
light of the earlier example it may be more in-
formative to the consumer to release income goals,
since the policy-maker's planned expenditures will
not be realized anyway. In this case, the govern-
ment would simply announce its intention to in-
crease income by $10 billion in each of the next
four years, stating that expenditures would be at
whatever level is required to produce this outcome.
This change in announced intentions would have
no effect upon the policy-maker's procedures for
forecasting future consumption and determining
future expenditure intentions, but it would affect
the consumer's valuation of future government
policy and hence the final outcome both in terms
of income and expenditures. For example, in the
first year the policy-maker would proceed as be-
fore, choosing expenditure levels that produce $10
billion in income under the assumption that con-
sumers forecast by means of an adaptive-expecta-
tions scheme. The consumer would use a different
29APPENDIX II
Consumer forecasts-prices only
A second type of rational-expectations model
may be developed where economic agents forecast
price rather than quantity variables. In this model.
economic decisions might depend upon the diver-
gence of actual prices from price forecasts. Con-
sumers might, for example, adjust planned expen-
ditures in an attempt to hold them constant in real
(price-adjusted) terms, but would treat an unantic-
ipated deviation of price from expectation as a
temporary change in the relative price of present
goods vis-a-vis future goods-perhaps postponing
current consumption outlays when prices are un-
expectedly high.
The consumption decision in 1977 would there-
fore depend upon
PH'" - E1D," (PIa")
which is the deviation of 1977 prices from the level
expected in the previous year. This forecast of
1977 prices might be based upon all available in-
formation, such as the expected path of future gov-
ernment expenditures and the impact of these ex-
penditures upon personal disposable income.
In the standard version of the life-cycle consump-
tion model, the level of current consumption is
assumed to depend upon the consumer's valuation
of his future lifetime income. The problem gen-
erally is viewed as one of judging the approximate
value of an uncertain quantity, in other words a
forecasting problem. But suppose that the con-
sumer did not have to forecast the future level of
income but instead had a large measure of choice
in the matter, given some "natural" restrictions
such as his current holdings of capital goods and
the value of his labor services. Then he could de-
termine the value of his future DPI at his own
discretion-depending, for example, upon whether
he greatly preferred leisure to added wages. One
of the determinants of his decision to work would
be the price level. If prices were high relative to
expectations, he might decide to increase his present
offering of labor services, hence increasing his Iife-
cycle income. At the old level of life-cycle income,
the same consumer-laborer might respond to price
increases by reducing present consumption, waiting
for future periods when prices would be closer to
his expectations to "catch up." However, unex-
pectedly higher prices would increase his life-cycle
income as well, since he offers more labor services
at higher prices. Therefore, the decision to reduce
or increase consumption would depend on the rela-
tive magnitude of income and substitution effects.
In this model, then, consumers may be assumed
to forecast prices only, and to consume on the
average at a fixed rate. They will revise their
planned consumption only if presented with a sur-
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prise change in prices. If prices increase above
expectations, the consumer will believe the increase
to be temporary, and therefore will find it advan-
tageous to defer some present consumption to the
future if the substitution effect of high present
prices is dominant.
By the same token, if prices fall below expecta-
tions, present consumption will be increased at the
expense of lost future consumption. When con-
sumption is subjected to a shock, however, time is
required for the consumer to readjust his consump-
tion to equilibrium levels. Thus we have
Ct
= a1Ct_1 + aZCt _Z + a3 [Pt - Et _1 (Pt )]
Et _1 (Pt ) E (PtIIt-1) aI' aZ > O,a3 < 0
The second of these two equations states the rule
by which the consumer forecasts future prices.
E t _ 1 (Pt ) is the price level that the consumer ex-
pects to find in period t from a perspective one
period in the past. This forecast is conditioned on
all the information, I t _1 , which is available to the
consumer in the earlier period. The consumer may
have some knowledge of the policymaker's plans,
and he may have some knowledge of the behavior
of the economy as well. These equations suggest
that if the policy-maker informs the consumer in
advance of his policy intentions, he cannot hope to
influence the consumer's behavior. This is because
the consumer is able to form price forecasts identi-
cal to those of the policy-maker when both possess
equal levels of information. Consider, for exam-
ple, the impact of an increase in government ex-
penditures, G. In this case, the consumer revises
his forecast of future prices:















+ Et _1 [Pt - Et _1 (PtIG)]
butsince Et _1 (Pt ) = Et _1 (PtIG)
i.e. consumer and policy-maker have the same in-
formation
and an announced increase in government expendi-
tures has no effect upon consumption.